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I analyze a program implemented in Texas schools serving underprivileged populations that pays 
both students and teachers for passing grades on Advanced Placement (AP) examinations. Using 
a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that program adoption is associated with increased AP 
course and exam taking, increases in the number of students with high SAT/ACT scores, and 
increases in college matriculation. The rewards don't appear to distort behaviors in undesirable 
ways, and I present evidence that teachers and students were not simply maximizing rewards. 
Guidance counselors credit the improvements to greater AP access, changes in social norms 
towards APs, and better student information. 
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I. Introduction    
The Advanced Placement Incentive Program (APIP) is a novel program that includes 
cash incentives for both teachers and students for each passing score earned on an advanced 
placement (AP) exam. The APIP has been expanded to over forty schools in Texas and is 
targeted primarily to low-income, minority-majority school districts with a view toward 
improving college readiness. Across the United States, college matriculation and completion 
rates for low-income and minority students are much lower than those for non-poor whites.1 
These differences may be due, in part, to low-income and minority students having lower 
participation rates in advanced courses such as APs (Klopfenstein 2004) and being less college 
ready as a result. These lower participation levels may reflect inefficiencies that can be 
ameliorated by the APIP, such as imperfect student information, student myopia, lack of student 
readiness, suboptimal teacher effort, or suboptimal track placement.2  
At the first Dallas high schools to adopt the program in 1996, the number of students 
taking AP exams in math, English, and science increased from 269 in 1995 to 729 in 1996. By 
2002, those schools had 132 passes per 1,000 juniors and seniors taking math, science, and 
English, compared to 86 in Texas and 80 in the United States (AP Strategies). Due to the 
perceived success of this program, New Mexico and New York City have adopted similar 
programs while schools in Arkansas, Alabama, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Virginia, 
and Washington have received grants to replicate the APIP.3 Cash incentive programs for 
students and teachers are growing in popularity and increasing in importance, but they are 
relatively new and are therefore not adequately studied nor understood.   I aim to provide much 
needed evidence on the efficacy of such programs by evaluating one of the earliest cash 
incentive programs in the United States Specifically, I answer the following questions: (1) Does 
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the APIP increase AP course enrollment and exam taking? (2) Do the APIP incentives distort 
behaviors in undesirable ways? (3) Does the APIP affect longer-term outcomes such as college 
enrollment? (4) What are the mechanisms through which the APIP may operate?  
The effect of the APIP reflects a combination of the effect of increased AP course taking 
and other aspects of the program such as teacher training and student and teacher incentives. The 
rationale behind the push to increase AP participation4 is the observation that students who take 
rigorous courses and exams in high school, such as APs, have higher SAT scores (College Board 
2003) and are more likely to enroll and be successful in college than their peers, as measured by 
GPA and graduation rates (Dodd et al. 2002; Dougherty et al. 2006; Eimers 2003; Geiser and 
Santelices 2004; Morgan and Ramist 1998). Since observationally similar students who take AP 
courses may differ in unobservable dimensions, such as motivation, and all these studies rely on 
observational data, it is unclear how much one can attribute to AP participation. The APIP, 
however, pays students and teachers for passing AP exam scores— producing exogenous 
variation in AP taking that is unrelated to students’ intrinsic motivation. As such, improvements 
in secondary and post-secondary outcomes associated with APIP adoption may reflect, in part, 
the causal effect of taking AP courses. 
The second important aspect of the APIP is the incentives for students and teachers. 
Research indicates that students and teachers respond to incentives in rewarded tasks.5 However, 
some studies suggest that providing incentives to students without the cooperation of teachers 
may be ineffective (Angrist and Lavy 2002; Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 2004). In addition, 
an agency model with multiple tasks (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) implies that incentives to 
perform on one dimension may cause agents to withdraw effort from others. For instance, 
teachers may spend less time on untested material when they are rewarded only for students’ test 
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performance and students may withdraw from difficult courses when they are rewarded for 
having high grade-point averages (Binder, Ganderton, and Hutchens 2002; Cornwell et al. 2005; 
Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer 2003;). While the APIP may improve AP outcomes, the incentives 
may lead teachers and students to divert resources away from non-AP activities in ways that 
could hurt non-AP students and undermine overall student achievement. This underscores the 
importance of looking at a broad range of AP and non-AP outcomes while also looking at 
longer-term outcomes such as college enrollment. The fact that improved AP outcomes could 
simply reflect increased test-taking effort as opposed to increased knowledge is further reason to 
look at a broad range of outcomes. 
Using aggregate school-level data, I identify the program effect by comparing the change 
in outcomes of cohorts within the same school, before and after APIP adoption, to the change in 
outcomes for cohorts in comparison schools over the same time period. By comparing cohorts 
within the same school, I eliminate self-selection within a cohort— the self selection that 
ordinarily makes one student enroll in AP courses and another not to do so. Since the program 
was not randomly adopted across schools, the remaining endogeneity concern is that the schools 
that adopted the APIP were somehow different than other schools. I eliminate this second form 
of self-selection by exploiting the fact that administrators could not roll out the program in all 
interested schools at once. I use as my main comparison group those schools that had already 
decided to adopt the APIP but had not yet had the opportunity to implement it. My comparison 
group also helps me account for potentially confounding statewide policies.6 Since program 
adoption was not random, I present falsification tests indicating that the timing of adoption was 
likely exogenous. My identification strategy is valid so long as schools have the same incoming 
distribution of students in their pre-program and post-program cohorts. I test this important 
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restriction empirically and can rule out most plausible scenarios of changing student selection 
into program schools.  
 I find that cohorts in schools affected by the program had more students taking AP or 
International Baccalaureate (IB) exams by the first year of APIP adoption and increases in AP 
course enrollment by the third year of adoption. Looking to a broader range of outcomes, by the 
second year of adoption affected cohorts had more students with high SAT/ACT scores and more 
students who matriculated at a college in Texas. While there are no differences by gender, some 
specifications suggest that the relative improvements may be largest for minority students. I find 
little evidence that APIP schools diverted resources away from non-AP students or activities. I 
present several pieces of evidence that suggest that the response was not simply due to students 
and teachers maximizing their cash rewards. This evidence is corroborated by guidance 
counselors’ claims that the increased AP participation was due to increased encouragement from 
teachers, better student information, and changes in teacher and peer norms. The findings 
contribute to the education incentives literature by presenting some of the first evidence that a 
well-designed cash incentive program for students and teachers can improve short-term and 
longer-term outcomes.7 The results also suggest that increasing participation and effort in 
rigorous courses such as APs can be effective in improving overall student outcomes.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows: section II describes the APIP; section III 
describes the data used; section IV lays out a theoretical framework within which to think about 
the APIP effect on AP participation and the other outcomes; section V motivates and describes 
the empirical strategy; section VI analyzes the results, and section VII provides conclusions.  
II.   Description of the Advanced Placement Incentive Program 
Advanced Placement courses are typically taken by students in 11th or 12th grade. The 
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courses are intended to be “college level” and most colleges allow successful AP exam takers to 
use them to offset degree requirements.8 The fact that selective colleges pay considerable 
attention to a student’s AP scores in the admissions process demonstrates that the exams are 
considered to be revealing of a student’s likely preparation for and achievement in college. The 
AP program has 35 courses and examinations across 20 subject areas. The length of a course 
varies from one to two semesters, depending on the pace chosen by the teacher and the scope of 
the subject (College Board).  The cost per examination is $82 and a fee reduction of $22 is 
granted to those students with demonstrated financial need. AP exams are administered by the 
College Board, making the type of cheating documented in Jacob and Levitt (2003) unlikely. The 
exams are graded from 1 through 5, with 5 being the highest and 3 generally regarded as a 
passing grade. AP courses are taught during regular class time and generally substitute for 
another course in the same subject (AP chemistry instead of 11th grade science, for example), for 
another elective course, or for a free period. While AP courses count toward a student’s high 
school GPA, they are above and beyond what is required for high school graduation. As a rule, 
an AP course substitutes for some activity that is less demanding. 9 
The APIP is run by AP Strategies, a non-profit organization based in Dallas, and is 
entirely voluntary for schools, teachers, and students. The heart of the program is a set of 
financial incentives for teachers and students based on AP examination performance. It also 
includes teacher training conducted by the College Board and a curriculum that prepares students 
for AP courses in earlier grades. The APIP uses “vertical teams” of teachers.  At the top of a 
vertical team is a lead teacher who teaches students and trains other AP teachers. Vertical teams 
also include teachers who teach grades that precede those in which AP courses are offered. For 
example, a vertical team might create a math curriculum starting in 7th grade designed to prepare 
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students for AP calculus in 12th grade. In addition to the AP courses taught at school, there may 
be extra time dedicated to AP training. For example, the APIP in Dallas includes special “prep 
sessions” for students, where up to 800 students gather at a single high school to take seminars 
from AP teachers as they prepare for their AP exams (Hudgins 2003). 
The APIP’s monetary incentives are intended to encourage participation and induce effort 
in AP courses. Lead teachers receive between $3,000 and $10,000 as an annual salary bonus, and 
a further $2,000 to $5,000 bonus opportunity that is based on results. Pre-AP teachers receive an 
annual supplement of between $500 and $1,000 per year for extra work. AP teachers receive 
between $100 and $500 for each AP score of 3 or over earned by an 11th or 12th grader enrolled 
in their course. In addition, AP teachers can receive discretionary bonuses of up to $1,000 based 
on results. While the amount paid per passing AP score and the salary supplements are well 
defined in each school, there is variation across schools. Overall, the APIP can deliver a 
considerable increase in compensation for teachers.10  
Students in 11th and 12th grade also receive monetary incentives for performance. The 
program pays half of each student’s examination fees so that students on a free or reduced lunch 
program would pay $15 (instead of $30), while those who are not would pay $30 (instead of $60) 
per exam. Students receive between $100 and $500 for each score of 3 or above in an eligible 
subject for which they take the course. The amount paid per exam is well defined in each school, 
but there is variation across schools in the amount paid per passing AP exam. A student who 
passes several AP examinations during 11th and 12th grades can earn several hundred dollars. For 
example, one student earned $700 in his junior and senior years for passing scores in AP 
examinations (Mathews 2004). Since students must attend the AP courses and pass the AP 
exams to receive the rewards, students who do not take the AP courses would not take the exams 
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in an attempt to earn the cash rewards. This aspect of the incentives makes them relatively 
difficult to game and likely to increase overall student learning.  
As a general rule, adoption of the APIP works as follows. First, schools that are interested 
in implementing the APIP approach AP Strategies and are put on a list.11 AP Strategies then tries 
to match interested schools to a donor. When a private donor approaches AP Strategies, he or she 
selects which schools to fund from within the group of willing schools. In most cases the donor 
wants schools within a specific district.12 Once a willing school has been accepted by the donor, 
preparations are made (such as training and creation of curricula) and the program is 
implemented the following calendar year.13 It takes about two years to fully implement the APIP 
after a school expresses interest.  
The donors choose the subjects that will be rewarded and ultimately determine the size of 
the financial rewards. While there are differences across schools, most schools reward English, 
mathematics, and sciences. There is variation in the timing across schools of when the program  
is introduced, which I exploit to identify the effect of the program. As illustrated in figure 1, 41 
schools adopted the APIP between 1995 and 2005 and 61 schools would have adopted the 
program by 2008, so the number of treated units is relatively small.14 Since donors chose the 
schools, donor availability and donor preferences are the primary reasons for variation in the 
timing of program implementation. To quote the vice president of AP Strategies, “Many districts 
are interested in the program but there are no donors. So there is always a shortage of donors.” 
Since several districts compete for the same donor, donor preferences determine the districts or 
the schools within a district that will adopt the program in any given year.15 I argue that the exact 
timing of which schools adopt the program, within the group of willing schools, is orthogonal to 
changes in unobserved school characteristics. I test this assumption empirically in section VI. 
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The total cost of the program ranges between $100,000 and $200,000 per school per year, 
depending on the size of the school and its students’ propensity to take AP courses. The average 
cost per student in an AP class ranges from $100 to $300. Private donors pay for 60 to 75 percent 
of the total costs of the program, and the district covers the remainder. Districts typically pay for 
teacher training and corresponding travel, release time, and some of the supplies and equipment 
costs. The donors fund the cash rewards to students and teachers, stipends to teachers for 
attending team meetings, bonuses to teachers and administrators for passing AP scores, and some 
of the supplies and equipment costs. Today, districts may be able to fund their contribution to the 
APIP using earmarked funds from the statewide AP incentive program and No Child Left Behind. 
However, in the first years of the program such funds were not available. 
III. Data 
The data on school demographics, high school graduation rates, and college entrance 
examinations come from the Texas Education Agency’s Academic Educational Indicator System 
(AEIS). I use these high school– level data for the academic years 1994 (1993-04) through 2005 
(2004-05). All years refer to academic years. Urbanicity data come from the Common Core. 
College enrollment data for 2002 through 2005 come from the Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board. The final dataset combines these publicly available data with a list of 
program schools obtained from AP Strategies. Forty schools adopted the APIP in sample, while 
59 were scheduled to have adopted the program by 2008. Since these data were created for state 
accountability purposes, several statistics are not in their ideal form (for example, the percentage 
of high school graduates in a given year who have taken the SAT/ACT exams as opposed to the 
number of students taking the SAT/ACT exams in a given year). Wherever possible, I have 
computed other variables that are easier to interpret in a regression setting. In some cases, such 
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computations were not possible and the reported statistics are used as is.    
Summary statistics in table 1 show sample means of the variables for 1993 through 1999 
and 2000 through 2005 for the APIP schools that adopted the program in sample (APIP schools), 
schools that were selected to adopt the program but had not yet done so in sample (future APIP 
schools), and schools that were never selected to adopt the APIP by 2008 (non-APIP schools). 
Restricting the data to high schools with SAT/ACT data reduces the sample to 1,438 schools 
from the universe of all public schools in Texas. The unit of observation is a school in a 
particular year, and all the variables are defined for a particular academic year.16 Since all 
schools adopt the APIP at the beginning of the academic year, I define a school to be treated as a 
school that will have been exposed to the APIP for at least one full academic year. For example, 
while the first schools to adopt the APIP did so in the 1995 calendar year, they are coded as first 
being treated in the 1996 (1995-96) academic year. 
Schools that were selected for the APIP were quite different from schools that have not 
yet been selected and may never be selected for the APIP. The APIP schools and future APIP 
schools had average total enrollments in 2000 through 2005 of 1731 and 2068 respectively—
much larger than the average enrollment of 715 students for non-APIP schools. Between 2000 
and 2005, 77 percent of the APIP schools and 67 percent of the future APIP schools were in a 
large or mid-sized city compared to only 20 percent for non-APIP schools.17 During the same 
time period, only 29 percent of the students at APIP schools and 14 percent of students at future 
APIP schools were white compared to 53 percent for non-APIP schools. However, the minority 
students in APIP schools were largely black, while Hispanics made up the majority of students at 
future APIP schools. Also between 2000 and 2005, about ten percent of students were limited 
English proficient at APIP and future APIP schools compared to less than four percent at non-
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APIP schools.  
For most outcomes, the APIP schools and future APIP schools performed worse than 
other Texas high schools. The variable “graduates” is the total number of high school graduates 
completing at least the minimum high school program.18 The ratio of 10th graders to graduates 
(two years later) was much lower in APIP and future APIP schools (about 0.75) than in non-
APIP schools (about 0.84). The ratio of AP course enrollment (which counts each student in each 
AP course) to school enrollment between 2000 and 2005 was 0.23 for APIP schools and 0.2 for 
future APIP schools, as compared to 0.45 for non-APIP schools. Despite this, the percentage of 
11th and 12th graders taking at least one AP or IB exam was 20 percent in APIP schools, 15 
percent in future APIP schools, and only 9.62 percent in non-APIP schools. This suggests that a 
greater proportion of 11th and 12th graders at APIP schools took the examination after having 
taken the course, or that in non-APIP schools many AP course enrollees were in 9th or 10th grade. 
For all schools, white 11th and 12th graders were much more likely to have taken at least one AP 
or IB exam than were minorities. The variable “college enrollees” is the total number of students 
who graduated that academic year who enrolled in any college (public or private) in Texas the 
fall of the following academic year. Between 2000 and 2005, the ratio of college attendees to 
graduates was 0.41 for the APIP schools and 0.40 for future APIP schools, compared to over 
0.60 for non-APIP schools. During this same time period, the ratio of high school graduates to 
12th graders scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT (based on exams taken at any time) was 
roughly 0.12 for APIP schools and 0.09 for future APIP schools compared to over 0.17 for non-
APIP schools. In all schools, white high school graduates outperformed both black and Hispanic 
students in the SAT/ACT examinations. 19  
IV. Theoretical Background 
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This section analyzes the APIP through the lens of the principal agent multitask model 
and the Becker-Rosen schooling decision model. While not exhaustive, these models highlight 
important mechanisms through which the APIP may affect AP participation, non-AP outcomes, 
and the decision to apply to and enroll in college.  
IV.A. The Effect of the APIP on AP Outcomes  
Suppose student AP output and student non-AP output (other educational output) are both 
functions of student and teacher effort in AP courses and student and teacher effort in other 
educational tasks, respectively. Under the APIP, teacher pay is more closely tied to the AP 
output of their students. The gains to a student of taking and doing well on AP exams are also 
greater under the APIP. A principal agent multitask model (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) 
predicts that where good AP performance is more likely with higher teacher and student effort, 
both teachers and students will exert more effort to improve student AP output. Therefore, one 
would expect (A) an increase in teacher effort to recruit students to take AP courses, (B) an 
increase in teacher effort to improve the quality of their instruction, (C) an increase in student AP 
exam taking, (D) an increase in student effort to perform well in AP exams, and (E) an increase 
in AP course enrollment.  
IV.B. The Effect of the APIP on Non-AP Outcomes  
A principal agent multitask model also predicts that students and teachers may divert 
effort away from other academic pursuits in order to increase their AP output. For example, to 
increase AP effort teachers may spend less time on their non-AP courses, schools may expend 
fewer resources to non-AP students, students may spend less time preparing for their non-AP 
courses and students may withdraw from other courses in order to take AP courses. As such, if 
there are no complementarities between AP output and non-AP output, and if students and 
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teachers solely maximize their rewards, the APIP could have deleterious effects on the academic 
outcomes of non-AP students and on non-AP outcomes. The lack of complementarities between 
AP output and non-AP output is unlikely, however, since students gain knowledge and skills 
through taking AP courses that they can use in other courses and in other academic spheres, and 
teachers may learn general teaching skills in their AP teacher training that make them better 
teachers in their non-AP classrooms. Since the incentive effect and the 
spillover/complementarity effect work in opposite directions, the effect of the APIP on non-AP 
outcomes, and therefore on educational outcomes overall, is theoretically ambiguous. This 
requires an empirical treatment, which I present in section VI. 
IV.C. The Effect of the APIP on College Decision  
To analyze how the APIP may affect the college-going decision, consider the Becker-
Rosen model. The log of earnings is an increasing concave function of the years of schooling 
)(sgey = . Individuals pay a cost to attend school ci (effort costs, tuition costs, foregone earnings), 
and discount the future at rate δ. Individuals choose the level of schooling s to maximize the 
present value of earnings minus costs. As a simplification, students choose between going to 
college for 4 years (s=4) or stopping schooling after high school (s=0). An individual chooses to 
attend college iff   
[1]  dteedtecdteeVV tgti
tg δδδ −∞−−∞ ∫∫∫ ≥−≡≥ 0 )0(404 )4()0()4( . 
As ci decreases, the individual’s utility associated with attending college increases, so that a 
reduction in the costs associated with college will make individuals more likely to attend college 
as opposed to ending their schooling after high school. It is useful to think of taking AP courses 
as a way to reduce college costs (increased likelihood of admission, more financial aid, tuition 
savings due to college credit, faster graduation, and signal to colleges about ability or 
 Jackson    14   
motivation). Since the increased AP participation (due to the APIP) will reduce an individual’s 
costs of attending college, for any given level of applications one would expect an increase in 
matriculation rates. The second way the APIP may affect the college-going decision is if students 
are unaware of their true ability to succeed at college. Learning their true cost ci as a result of 
taking AP courses could affect their college enrollment decisions.20 All else equal, if they learn 
that they are able to cope with and enjoy the material, they may be more likely to apply to 
college and vice versa. The direction and magnitude of this information effect depends on (1) the 
number of students on the margin of applying to college, (2) whether marginal students are 
optimistic or pessimistic about their abilities, and (3) the quality of AP instruction.  
IV.D. The Student Decision to Take AP Courses  
Policies that provide monetary rewards to students for taking and doing well on AP 
exams presume that students are not already making optimal decisions. It is therefore instructive 
to lay out a rational choice framework of AP participation to highlight how and why the APIP 
might affect student decisions. Consider a college-bound student’s decision to take AP courses. 
Taking AP courses reduces college costs from c0 to c1 and entails a cost τ. In the absence of the 
APIP, a student only takes AP courses if the present discounted value of the college cost savings 
is greater than the private cost of taking AP courses. Specifically iff 
[2]  0 10 ( )
s tc c e d tδτ −≤ −∫ where }4,0{∈s .       
Under the APIP, students who take AP courses earn a reward π  for passing AP exams at time 1. 
Under the APIP, students take AP exams if the present value of the costs minus the rewards is 
less than the savings in college costs or iff 
[3]  0 10 ( )
s te c c e d tδ δτ π− −≤ + −∫  where }4,0{∈s .     
The savings associated with passing out of a semester of college and the recouped labor 
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force earnings is about a third of one’s annual salary plus half of a year’s tuition costs.21 If one 
were to add the increase in earnings potential associated with being more likely to go to college 
and getting into a more selective college, the benefits to AP taking would be even greater. In 
contrast, the average value of the rewards is less than $200 per student and the test fee reduction 
is at most $30.22 The key insight of this model is that irrespective of the size of the costs (effort 
or otherwise) to taking AP courses, the marginal change in lifetime benefits due to the APIP is 
small, so that if students were behaving optimally, there would be a small participation response. 
Any sizable AP participation response would require that (1) students were myopic and 
overvalued the rewards in the near future, (2) students were uninformed about the benefits to AP 
taking, or (3) students were more likely to take AP courses under the APIP for reasons unrelated 
to their present discounted value of income stream, such as changes in constraints, increases in 
the supply of AP courses, changes in peer attitudes toward AP courses, or greater teacher 
encouragement.23 The testimonial evidence presented in section VI suggests explanation (3).  
IV.E. The Timing of Effects  
Since the cash incentives may lead to increased student interest and increased 
encouragement from teachers, one might expect to see improvements in many outcomes 
immediately. Since the APIP rewards affect students in 11th and 12th grades, however, any effects 
that operate through the duration of exposure to AP courses (such as SAT/ACT scores) should 
be larger in the second year than in the first. Many effects may show incremental improvements 
over time since the APIP also includes training for pre-AP teachers; there may be “learning-by-
doing” effects; and the size of the pool of prepared prospective AP students may increase over 
time. 
V. Identification Strategy 
 Jackson    16   
My basic strategy is to identify the effect of the program using a difference-in-differences 
(DID) methodology: comparing the change in outcomes across exposed and unexposed cohorts 
for schools that adopted the APIP to the change in outcomes across cohorts for schools that did 
not adopt the APIP over the same time period. This strategy has the benefit of (1) removing any 
pre-treatment differences that may exist between schools that decided to adopt the APIP and 
those that did not and (2) removing self-selection within a cohort by making cross-cohort 
comparisons (that is, I do not compare AP students to non-AP students within a cohort). This 
strategy relies on the assumption that the difference in outcomes across cohorts for the 
comparison schools is the same, in expectation, as what the adopting schools would have 
experienced had they not adopted the APIP. For the changes in comparison schools to be a 
credible counterfactual for what the APIP schools would have experienced in the absence of the 
APIP, the comparison schools must be similar to the APIP adopting schools in both observable 
and unobservable ways. Since APIP schools and non-APIP schools have very different 
observable characteristics (see table 1), using all other Texas high schools as the comparison 
group would be misguided. 
Due to a scarcity of donors, AP Strategies could not implement the APIP in all interested 
schools at the same time. This allows me to restrict the estimation sample to only those schools 
that either adopted the APIP or will have adopted the APIP by 2008—using the change in 
outcomes for APIP schools that did not yet have the opportunity to implement the program 
(future APIP schools) as the counterfactual change in outcomes. Table 1 shows that the APIP 
schools and future APIP schools are similar in most respects. One notable difference is that the 
APIP schools have large black enrollment shares while future APIP schools have large Hispanic 
enrollment shares. Such differences are not unexpected since the sample of treated schools is 
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small and the timing of APIP adoption was not completely random. This sample restriction has 
two important benefits: (1) since APIP-willing schools are observationally similar, they are 
likely to share common time shocks, and (2) since all schools that agreed to adopt the APIP were 
similarly motivated and interested, restricting the sample in this way avoids comparing schools 
with motivated principals who want to adopt the APIP to schools with unmotivated principals 
who have no interest in the program. This sample restriction controls for school self-selection on 
unobserved characteristics and allows for a consistent estimate of the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT).24  
Within this subsample of APIP-willing schools, identification relies on the assumption 
that the exact timing of APIP implementation was exogenous to other within-school changes.  
Since all willing schools had to wait for a donor to adopt the APIP, and timing of actual adoption 
relies on idiosyncratic donor preferences and availability, this assumption is plausible. Readers 
may worry that if donors selected schools based on the enthusiasm of school principals and 
administrators, or if some schools expressed interest before others, then the timing of adoption 
may not be orthogonal to school characteristics. Since donor choices were not random, I cannot 
entirely rule this out. However, it is important to note that all regressions use within-school 
variation so that differences in time-constant school enthusiasm or motivation will not confound 
the results. The only problem would be if adoption were coincident with changes in unobserved 
school enthusiasm or motivation. As noted earlier, it takes about two years to implement the 
APIP after expressing interest. In section VI, I show that the timing of when a school is likely to 
expresses interest in the APIP is not associated with improved outcomes, while the timing of 
actual adoption is, suggesting that the assumption of exogenous timing of adoption is valid. 
This difference-in-differences (DID) strategy described above is implemented by 
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estimating equation [4] by OLS on the APIP and future APIP sample. 
[4]  ititititit XTreatY εθτψβα +++′+⋅+=  .    
Where Yit is the outcome for school i in year t, Treatit is an indicator variable that takes the value 
of 1 if the school has adopted the APIP by that particular year and 0 otherwise, Xit is a matrix of 
time varying school enrollment and demographic variables, τt is a year fixed-effect, θi is a 
school-specific intercept, and εit is the idiosyncratic error term. The coefficient on Treatit 
captures the average before/after difference in outcomes. Since outcomes may not improve 
immediately, the simple before/after comparison may understate the effect of APIP adoption. As 
such, I also estimate more flexible models that allow the effect to vary by years since 
implementation. 
VI. Results 
I present the results in four sections.  In section VI.A, I document the effect of adopting 
the APIP on AP course enrollment, AP/IB exam taking, high school graduation, SAT/ACT 
performance, and college matriculation. I extend the analysis to investigate how APIP adoption 
affects outcomes over time. In section VI.B, I discuss various potential threats to validity and 
present falsification tests showing that the identification strategy is likely valid. In section VI.C, I 
present certain effects by gender and ethnicity and show that the effects of the APIP on 
SAT/ACT performance cannot be solely attributed to selective migration. Finally, in section 
VI.D I present evidence from discussions with guidance counselors for why and how the APIP 
affects student outcomes, and I present the results of various tests of the hypothesis that students 
and teachers responded to the incentives in manners consistent with revenue maximizing.  
VI. A  Main Results  
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the outcomes after removing year means and school 
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means for the APIP-willing schools before and after adoption. It is visually apparent that the 
distributions of the residuals after APIP adoption are to the right of the distributions before APIP 
adoption for AP course enrollment, the percentage of 11th or 12th graders taking at least one AP 
or IB exam, the number of students scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT, and the number of 
students enrolling in college in Texas. In contrast, the distributions for the number of high school 
graduates and students taking the SAT/ACT exams are largely unchanged before and after APIP 
adoption. This suggests that the APIP increased AP course enrollment, AP/IB exam taking, 
scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT, and college matriculation, but had no effect of 
SAT/ACT taking or graduating from high school. While not formal statistical tests, figure 2 
provides an instructive graphical preview of the regression findings. 
 The main regression results are summarized in table 2. The reported variable of interest 
is “treat,” which indicates that the APIP had been adopted for at least one academic year. I 
present the effect of APIP adoption on each outcome in a separate row. Each column represents a 
different specification so that each column row entry presents the results from a separate 
regression model. Since AP enrollment data are only available for 2000 onward and AP/IB and 
college data are only available for 2001 onward, these variables have smaller sample sizes than 
the other variables.25 The results would be qualitatively similar but less precise if one were to use 
the largest possible balanced sample with data from 2001 through 2005. All results are based on 
the APIP-willing schools only. 26 
VI. A.1     Effect on AP Outcomes  
The AP outcomes used in this paper are the log of AP course enrollment and the 
percentage of 11th and 12th graders taking AP or IB exams. The naïve specifications in models 1, 
2, 7, and 8 show that while APIP adoption is associated with an increases in AP course 
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enrollment and increases in the percentage of 11th and 12th graders who took AP or IB exams, 
after controlling only for year fixed effects and school fixed effects, APIP adoption is associated 
with a statistically insignificant 8.2 percent increase in AP course enrollment and a 2.55 point 
increase in the percentage of 11th and 12th graders who took AP or IB exams. Since the results in 
models 1, 2, 7, and 8 do not control for any changes in enrollment or demographics over time, 
these results may not reflect a causal relationship. In the first preferred specification (models 3 
and 9), I test for the effect of APIP adoption net of any possible effect it may have on 11th or 12th 
grade enrollment. As such, I control for the size of the affected cohort—so that I control for 11th 
grade enrollment, 12th grade enrollment, lagged 11th grade enrollment, and lagged 10th grade 
enrollment. The results in models 3 and 9 show that APIP adoption is not associated with a 
statistically significant increase in log AP course enrollment, but is associated with a 2.3 point 
increase in the percentage of 11th and 12th graders taking an AP or IB exam. To increase 
efficiency, I estimate a less restrictive model that allows observationally similar schools to have 
different time shocks. Specifically, I estimate a propensity score for each school based on the 
school demographic variables and historical values of the outcomes, assign each school its 
maximum estimated propensity score for all years, put each school into deciles of the maximum 
score, and include year fixed effects for each maximum propensity score decile.27 The results are 
presented in models 4 and 10. As expected, the findings are qualitatively similar, however, the 
standard errors are smaller for key variables. 
Since the APIP could affect outcomes by affecting the size of the 11th and 12th grade class 
enrollments, while not changing the proportion of 11th or 12th graders who take AP courses or 
take AP/IB exams, the third row shows regression results that do not control for 
contemporaneous 11th and 12th grade enrollment. This model controls for the initial size of the 
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affected cohorts (lagged 10th grade and lagged 11th grade enrollments) but does not control for 
the size of the cohort after APIP adoption. The results in models 5 and 11 are almost identical to 
those in models 3 and 4, and 9 and 10, indicating that the APIP did not increase AP course 
enrollment immediately after adoption (even if we allow effects through increases in cohort size). 
Models 6 and 12 shows estimates where none of the 10th, 11th or 12th grade enrollments are 
included. As one can see, this has little effect on the estimated coefficients.  
VI. A.2     Effect on Non-AP Outcomes  
Rows 3 through 6 in table 2 present the results for the non-AP outcomes. I will focus on 
the preferred models (columns 3 through 6) that control for school fixed effects, year fixed 
effects, and school level controls for enrollment and demographic changes over time. Since these 
outcomes are based on the cohort of high school graduates, I control for cohort size by including 
12th grade enrollment and the lag of 11th grade enrollment as covariates. All of these outcomes 
are in logs so that the interpretation is the percent increase in the outcome associated with APIP 
adoption. The basic DID results that control for school fixed effects, year fixed effects, the 
number of mobile students, student demographic variables, the log of grade 12 enrollment, and 
the lag of the log of grade 11 enrollment are presented in the third column (models 15, 21, 27 
and 33),. The results show that while the APIP does not have a statistically significant effect on 
the number of high school graduates or graduates who take the SAT/ACT exams, APIP adoption 
is associated with a 13 percent increase in the number of students scoring above 1100/24 on the 
SAT/ACT and a marginally statistically significant 4.96 percent increase in the number of 
students matriculating in college. The fourth column (models 16, 22, 28 and 34) presents the 
results that allow schools with different estimated propensity scores to have different time effects. 
As with the AP outcomes, this model has little effect on the estimated coefficients, but it reduces 
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the standard errors of the regression substantially thereby increasing statistical power. All 
subsequent models include these year effects for different propensity groups. The fifth column 
(models 17, 23, 29 and 35)  presents regression results that do not control for 12th grade 
enrollment, which could be affected by exposure to the APIP. Not controlling for 12th grade 
enrollment has no discernable effect on the results. The sixth column (models 18, 24, 30 and 36)  
shows results that do not control for 12th grade or lagged 11th grade enrollment—again, the 
parameter estimates are virtually unchanged by this omission. These results make clear that any 
effects of the APIP on the outcomes of interest are not working through effects on cohort size. 
However, since controlling for cohort size does reduce the size of the standard errors without 
affecting the coefficients, all subsequent analyses include controls for cohort size. 
VI. A.3     Dynamic Effects  
  Since certain aspects of the APIP may take time to have an effect, I show these main 
outcomes during the first year, second year, and third plus year of the APIP. Specifically, I 
estimate specifications like equation [4], replacing the before/after indicator for APIP adoption 
with indicator variables denoting whether it is the first year of the APIP, the second year of the 
APIP, or the third year and beyond of the APIP. As before, all estimates are relative to before 
APIP adoption. The coefficients will map out how the program affects outcomes over time. With 
more data one could map out pre-treatment years and more post-treatment years, however, data 
limitations preclude such estimates. Note that comparisons of first year estimates and third year 
estimates will not be on a balanced sample of schools since not all schools are observed in their 
first, second, and third years of adoption in sample.28 As such, the coefficients on the “years 
since adoption” variables will reflect the dynamic effects of the program, and may also reflect 
differences in program response or implementation across schools.  
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 Table 3 reports the coefficients on the indicator variables denoting the years since APIP 
adoption. Column 1 shows that while there is no statistically significant APIP effect on AP 
course enrollment in the first year, by the third year there is a statistically significant 33 percent 
increase. Column 2 shows that there is a 1.8 point increase in the percentage of 11th and 12th 
graders taking at least one AP or IB exam the first year of the APIP and about a 3.5 point 
increase thereafter. Taken together, the results show that much of the increased AP exam taking 
in the first two years was not driven by more students taking AP courses, but was likely a result 
of marginal students who already took AP courses but would not have taken the exams, being 
more likely to take the AP exams. By the third year and beyond, however, increases in the 
percentage of 11th and 12th graders taking AP/IB exams appear to be driven by both an increase 
in AP course taking, and an increase in AP/IB exam taking conditional on AP course taking. 
 Column 4 shows that APIP adoption may be associated with a marginally statistically 
significant decrease in SAT/ACT taking after the second year. While this could indicate that 
after two years students at APIP schools are nine percent less likely to take the SAT, given that 
the finding is not statistically significant at the five percent level, this may simply be noise. Since 
high school graduates in the first year of the APIP may only have had one year of AP course 
taking, while the second cohort and beyond would have had two years, one might expect the 
APIP effect to increase substantially from the first year, to the second year and beyond. Also, 
since students may have taken the SAT/ACT before the end of the school year, the SAT/ACT 
effects in the first year may reflect only half a year of APIP exposure for certain students. 
Therefore, one may expect relatively small first year SAT/ACT effects compared to the size of 
second year effects. This is consistent with what one observes. Column 5 shows statistically 
significant 15.7, 22.7, and 27.6 percent increases in the number of students scoring above 
 Jackson    24   
1100/24 on the SAT/ACT in the first, second, and third years and beyond, respectively. The 
relatively large first year effect on scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT is surprising given 
that it may not reflect a full year’s exposure to the APIP for many students. The relatively large 
first year effect would be consistent with the APIP having a positive effect on general motivation 
or effort rather than improving SAT/ACT performance through increases AP exposure alone. 
Column 6 shows that APIP adoption is associated with a statistically significant six percent 
increase in college matriculation in year two and a marginally statistically significant 7.25 
percent increase in the third year and beyond.  
VI. B Endogeneity Concerns and Falsification Tests 
Section VI. A shows that APIP adoption is associated with increased AP participation, 
improved SAT/ACT performance, and increased college going. There remain, however, three 
potential threats to validity that should be addressed. Specifically, (1) early adopters may differ 
from late adopters in ways that bias the results, (2) the timing of adoption may be endogenous, 
and (3) selective migration (an inflow of smart, motivated students) into APIP schools could 
drive the results.  
 To ensure that the findings are not driven by comparing the first set of early adopters (in 
1996), who may have already had more rapid improvement in outcomes, to the later adopters 
(after 2000), columns 7 through 12 of table 3 show the dynamic regressions on the APIP-willing 
sample after removing the early-adopting schools. If the early adopters were more motivated so 
that the results were driven by school selection, the results should be smaller or non-existent in 
the sample of late adopters. In fact, the effects in columns 7 through 12 are larger than those 
using the full APIP sample, suggesting that comparing late to early adopters was not driving the 
results; if there is any bias in comparing late to early adopters, such bias would likely attenuate 
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rather than inflate the APIP effects. The results show that APIP adoption is associated with 
statistically significant increases in AP course enrollment, the number of students scoring above 
1100/24 on the SAT/ACT, and the number of students matriculating in college. The loss of 
statistical significance for AP/IB exam taking between columns 2 and 7 is clearly the result of 
larger standard errors rather than a lack of an effect since the coefficients are very similar.  
 The second concern is that the exact timing of adoption may be endogenous. Within the 
group of APIP schools, adoption of the APIP could reflect changes in school motivation if 
schools that became more motivated over time adopted the APIP first because they expressed 
interest first. It typically takes two years between when a school first expresses interest in the 
APIP and when it is implemented. Therefore, if unobserved changes in motivation led schools to 
express interest in the APIP, one should observe improved results for APIP schools two years 
before actual APIP adoption. The last column of table 2, labeled “placebo treatment,” shows the 
coefficient on the two-year lead of adoption.29 None of the coefficients are statistically 
significant and the signs are often the opposite of the actual adoption estimates. This suggests 
that the APIP schools only saw improvements after they adopted APIP and not before (when 
they would have expressed a desire to implement the APIP)— as one would expect if the timing 
of adoption was exogenous. 
The last concern is that the results were driven by selective migration. I present three 
pieces of evidence showing that this was not the case. First, if schools that adopted the APIP had 
an inflow of high-ability students, there would have been associated with APIP adoption an 
increase in school enrollment and in grade 12 enrollment. To test for this possibility, I estimate 
the effects of APIP adoption on grade 12 and school enrollment. I control for the lag of grade 12 
enrollment and the lag of school enrollment. Columns 1 and 2 of table 4 show that while the 
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point estimates are positive, there is no statistically significant relationship between APIP 
adoption and grade 12 enrollment or school enrollment.  
Readers may still worry that the results could have been driven by changes in the 
selectivity of in-migration. Therefore, I test for changes in selective migration. Suppose the only 
effect the APIP had was to attract smart, motivated students to enroll (transfer) in program 
schools. If this were so, one would observe increases in the number of high school graduates, the 
number of students who attain Texas Academic Skills Program (TASP) equivalency, the number 
of students taking the SAT/ACT in addition to the improved SAT/ACT results, and the number 
of students matriculating in college.  The results in tables 3 and 4 show that this did not occur. 
The estimates in columns 3, 4, and 5 of table 4 show that there was no statistically significant 
effect of the APIP on the number of students achieving TASP equivalency or the number 
graduates, and that the point estimate for the number of student taking the SAT/ACT exams is 
negative.30 The findings are inconsistent with the effects of the APIP being the result of selective 
migration.  
Another way to show robustness to selective migration is to aggregate up to the school-
district level and run district-level regressions. Since most cross-school migration would occur 
within districts rather than across districts, results based on district-level variation in treatment 
intensity would be robust to within district selective migration.  To show robustness to selective 
migration, one would like to show that as APIP treatment intensity increases within a district, 
there are improvements relative to other districts. Table 5 presents these district-level regressions 
where the variable of interest is the share of treated schools in the district at that point in time, 
and all variation is based on within-district variation over time. The district-level regression 
results are similar to the main results in table 2, suggesting that selective migration within a 
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district was not driving the main results. Since selective migration is such an important concern, 
that in section VI. C I show that the SAT/ACT results are robust to looking only at the sample of 
students who did not transfer and were in the same high school for all four years. These tests 
present strong evidence against the selective migration hypothesis.  
VI. C Effects by Gender and Race 
In this section I present results based on subsamples based on gender and race. It has 
been established that AP participation of minorities and low-income students tends to be lower 
than that of middle-class white students at the same high schools (Klopfenstein 2004). Insofar as 
these differences reflect suboptimal student or teacher effort, one might expect larger increases in 
AP participation among these groups. The analysis by gender is motivated by a growing 
literature documenting that females are more responsive to interventions than males31 and that 
among adolescents, girls have more self-discipline and delay gratification more than boys 
(Duckworth, Lee, and Seligman 2006; Silverman 2003). 
Due to the nature in which the data are available, the outcomes are reported in 
percentages. Table 6 shows the effect of APIP adoption on the percentage of 11th or 12th graders 
who took at least one AP/IB exam. The results show that the campus-wide increases in AP/IB 
exam-taking were driven by increased participation for black and Hispanic students. The results 
do not show any statistically significant effect of the APIP on the proportion of white students 
who took at least one AP or IB exam. This does not mean that the number of AP/IB exams did 
not increase for the white students at APIP schools, but that the number of white students 
affected was unchanged. It is possible that those white students who took one AP exam now take 
more AP courses and exams. The results in columns 5 and 6 show that there were increases in 
AP/IB exam taking for both genders with no greater effect on girls. 
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Given the differences in the effect of the APIP on the number of 11th and 12th graders 
across ethnicities who took at least one AP or IB exam, one would expect to see the 
corresponding differences in the effect of the APIP on SAT/ACT performance. Table 7 shows 
the effect of the APIP on the percentage of non–special education high school graduates who 
scored above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT examinations for the different groups. By the third year 
of the program there were positive effects for all groups. Given that Hispanics and blacks are 
typically underrepresented at the top of the graduating class, they have more room for 
improvement. While the percentage point changes are similar for white, black, and Hispanic 
students (around 5 points), the differences in relative impact, however, are sizable. Compared to 
the base levels this represents about a 25 percent increase for whites, a 50 percent increase for 
Hispanics, and a near 100 percent increase for blacks. The fact that the number of white students 
taking at least one AP/IB exam did not increase suggests that the gains in SAT/ACT 
performance experienced by white students may have been due to their taking more AP courses, 
increasing their effort in their courses, increases in the quality of AP instruction, or all three. 
To ensure that the improvements in SAT/ACT performance were not driven by selective 
migration, I obtained school aggregate counts of the number of white and Hispanic graduates 
scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT for the subset of high school graduates who were at the 
same high school for all four years of their career (that is, those students who did not migrate). 
Due to heavy data masking, these data are not available for black students.32 Table 8 shows the 
effect of APIP adoption on white and Hispanic graduates scoring above 1100/24 on the 
SAT/ACT. Due to data masking there are some missing values that correspond to counts that are 
between 0 and 4. Table 8 shows that the findings are robust to assuming values of 0, 2, or 4 for 
masked data. Making the reasonable assumption that a masked count is equal to 2, the results in 
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table 8 show that by year three the APIP increases the number of Hispanic and white students 
scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT by 18 percent and 26 percent respectively. I also 
obtained counts for graduates scoring above 900 on the SAT or 19 on the ACT exams. By year 
three the APIP increases the number of Hispanic and white graduates scoring above 900/19 on 
the SAT/ACT by 38 percent and 26 percent respectively. However, there does not seem to be an 
increase in the number of black students scoring above 900 on the SAT or 19 on the ACT. This 
provides conclusive evidence that the APIP improves SAT/ACT outcomes (at least for white and 
Hispanic students) and that the improvements are not due to selective migration.  
VI. D Mechanisms and Tests of Distortions  
Given the improvements in SAT/ACT performance and college matriculation, one would 
expect to see that more students were actually exposed to more rigorous course material due to 
APIP adoption. For this to be the case, students could not have simply diverted their effort away 
from other advanced courses (such as dual enrollment courses, or college courses taken while in 
high school) in order to take AP courses. If students and teachers were simply revenue 
maximizers, one would observe a decrease in dual enrollment courses as a result of APIP 
adoption. However, column 7 of table 4 shows little evidence of this kind of distortion: by the 
third year of the APIP one sees a very small statistically insignificant decrease in dual enrollment 
course taking. This suggests that students and teachers did not game the incentives by 
substituting away from other advanced courses toward AP courses, resulting in an overall 
increase in rigorous course participation.  
Evidence from discussions with guidance counselors at three different APIP high schools 
in Dallas strongly suggests there were school-wide campaigns to increase participation in AP 
courses after APIP adoption. At two of the three high schools an additional guidance counselor 
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was hired to improve the school’s ability to identify those students who should be encouraged to 
take AP courses. At all three schools, the guidance counselors were given explicit instructions to 
identify those students who should be taking AP courses and to encourage AP participation. A 
large part of this campaign involved providing information. Guidance counselors and AP 
teachers sold the AP program to students who were interested in going to college, citing the 
scholarships one could earn based on AP scores, the tuition one could save by graduating at an 
accelerated pace, and the potential increase in high school GPA, which could increase the 
student’s likelihood of being in the class’s top ten percent and gaining admittance into a good 
college. There is also evidence that certain barriers to taking AP courses were removed; at one 
high school, there used to be a minimum class rank that a student had to have in order to take AP 
courses, but after the APIP was adopted any interested student was allowed to take these courses. 
All guidance counselors mentioned a shift in student and teacher attitudes toward AP courses. 
AP courses are now considered difficult courses that anyone can take, as opposed to being 
available only for the very brightest of students (one AP teacher noted that she now has to turn 
students away). The example of the AP English teacher who had 11 students in 1995 and 110 
students in 2003 highlights the difference in participation. Counselors claim that the reasons for 
the large increases in AP participation had to do with student information, increased access 
through teacher encouragement, and increased teacher and guidance counselor recommendations. 
The financial incentives to students and teachers may have been responsible for the increased 
student and teacher effort in AP courses, but these aspects of the program were downplayed by 
the counselors.  
The large increases in AP participation are difficult to reconcile with the theoretical 
framework put forward in section IV without reference to several of the elements highlighted by 
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guidance counselors. The theory and evidence thus far have suggested that students and teachers 
were not simply behaving like revenue maximizers. While the data are limited in scope, 
differences in the way the APIP was implemented across schools allow for certain hypotheses 
regarding incentives to be tested. If the results are solely due to revenue maximizing behaviors, 
one might expect the APIP effect to be monotonically increasing in the size of the cash rewards. 
I test this prediction in a regression model by interacting the “treat” variable with the levels of 
the rewards ($100 per exam, $101-$499 per exam, and $500 per exam). Note that schools with 
higher student rewards also paid higher teacher rewards. Since the incentive levels were not 
exogenously determined and the sample of schools within each incentive level group is small, 
differences could reflect differences in implementation and response to the program. As such, 
these findings should not be taken as conclusive but regarded as part of a larger body of evidence. 
Evidence presented in table 9 supporting the notion that that the effects of the program 
were stronger in schools with higher incentives is mixed at best. Column 1 shows that the 
schools that paid between $101 and $499 per exam had the greatest AP enrollment response, and 
the coefficient for schools that paid $500 per exam is the smallest. In column 2, the schools that 
paid $100 per exam had the largest AP/IB exam taking response. Column 5 shows that while all 
schools had improved SAT/ACT results, schools that paid $500 per exam had the smallest 
improvements and those that paid in the middle range had the most. College going in column 6 is 
the only outcome where the highest reward group has the largest effect. However, the effect is 
not monotonic: the middle incentive group actually has a negative coefficient while schools that 
pay $100 per exam have a positive coefficient. For none of the outcomes are the effects 
monotonically increasing in the size of the rewards and in only one outcome is the effect largest 
where the rewards are largest. In sum, the results of table 9 do not support the hypothesis that the 
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APIP effect is increasing in the size of the rewards. 
The last test is based on the hypothesis that if students and teachers were responding 
solely to the rewards, there should have been a greater participation response in subjects for 
which rewards were provided than in subjects for which there was no reward. In fact, one might 
expect a decline in enrollments in AP courses for which rewards were not provided. There were 
a few schools that offered rewards for all AP subjects while most only offered rewards for math, 
science, and English. I test whether the increase in the ratio of the number of math, science, and 
English AP course enrollees to the number of total AP course enrollees is smaller in APIP-
adopting schools that paid rewards for social studies and humanities, by interacting “treat” with 
an indicator for whether the schools rewarded social studies AP exams. Again, this evidence 
should be taken as suggestive. The preferred model yields a coefficient of -0.003 with a standard 
error of 0.04 on the “treat” variable and a coefficient of 0.11 with a standard error of 0.029 on the 
interaction with whether the school gave rewards for social studies. The interaction is statically 
significant and is positive, suggesting that students took a greater share of math, science, and 
English AP courses at schools that gave rewards for social science courses. This result is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that students and teachers substituted away from AP courses for 
which there were no rewards toward those for which there were rewards.  
VII. Conclusions 
Using a carefully selected of group of comparison schools within which APIP adoption is 
likely exogenous, I find that the APIP is associated with increases in the number of students 
taking AP courses and the number of students taking AP/IB exams. Moreover, APIP adoption is 
associated with increases in the number of students scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT 
exams and the number of students who matriculate in college. I show that these results are not 
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driven by comparing early adopters to late adopters, endogenous timing of APIP adoption, or 
selective migration. While there are no significant differences by gender, I find substantially 
increased AP/IB exam taking for black and Hispanic students. I also find improvements in 
SAT/ACT performance across all ethnic groups and for both males and females.  
The improvements in SAT/ACT performance were likely the result of increased exposure 
to rigorous material, but could also have been the result of increased effort in SAT/ACT if 
students studied harder for both AP and SAT/ACT in order to get into college. The lack of an 
increase in SAT/ACT taking suggests that the APIP may not affect students’ college application 
decisions and that the increased college matriculation was the result of the lower effective 
college costs (tuition, effort, time, etc.). However, it is possible that there was an effect on 
college application behavior that was not picked up by SAT/ACT taking. The theoretical 
possibility that students and teachers would divert resources away from other tasks toward AP 
courses is not supported by the data. The APIP had no effect on the number of 12th graders who 
graduated from high school, the number of 10th graders who graduated from high school, or the 
proportion of high school graduates who attained TASP equivalency. However, the APIP may 
have had negative effects on other unobserved outcomes. The fact that there are some benefits 
with no measured ill effects suggests that, prior to adoption, the selection into AP courses may 
have been suboptimal, so that marginal students who may have benefited from taking AP courses 
were not doing so.  
The curricular changes and the early emphasis on pre-AP material would not have 
affected graduating seniors until a few years after the program had been adopted. Therefore, the 
changes that took place at year one of the APIP were likely due to the incentives, the AP courses, 
and improvements in AP instruction.33 The fact that there is an increase in program effect over 
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time suggests that the push to promote AP participation in early grades through emphasis on pre-
AP courses and vertical teams may also have been effective.  
The improvements in AP instruction would have had little effect if there were not a 
concurrent increase in the number of students taking AP exams. The anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the APIP gave teachers the impetus to increase AP course enrollment, guidance counselors 
the incentive to advertise and inform students of the AP program’s benefits, and students the 
incentives to take them. Guidance counselors claim that the alignment of school, student, and 
teacher incentives had a strong effect on the culture and attitudes of both students and educators, 
which in turn led to improved student outcomes. The empirical tests suggest that the APIP was 
working through some mechanism other than students and teachers reacting directly to the 
monetary incentives in a “carrot and stick” manner. The body of evidence is more consistent 
with explanations put forth by guidance counselors, such as changes in peer norms and teacher 
norms, increased emphasis on AP courses, and increased information given to students on the 
benefits to taking AP courses. The findings are suggestive of some of the reasons we observe 
suboptimal educational choices in low-income, low-performing schools. The fact that the AP/IB 
exam participation response was much larger (on the extensive margin) for black and Hispanic 
students suggests that they may have had low initial participation rates because (1) peer norms 
did not promote taking AP courses, (2) they were less likely to have good information on the 
college application process, and (3) student aspirations may have been low due to suboptimal 
teacher encouragement. The sum of the evidence suggests that student or teacher incentives 
alone would not have been as effective since it was likely the combination of increased teacher 
effort, increased student effort, and better instruction that lead to improved outcomes over time. 
This is consistent with the finding of larger gains when college students were provided with 
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incentives and services than with incentives alone (Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos 2009), and 
with individual student incentives being less effective when teachers were not aware (Angrist 
and Lavy 2002).  
While these results are encouraging in light of the rapid growth of similar programs, the 
long-term effects of the APIP on college and labor-force outcomes is unknown. The program 
costs about $200 per student who takes an AP exam. If this program increases a student’s 
likelihood of attending college, increases the quality of college attended, and reduces the time it 
takes to graduate from college, the costs of the program on a per-student basis will be far less 
than the average increase in lifetime earnings. In addition to the private costs associated with 
having students attend college who are not college ready, as of 2006, Texas was spending  $80 
million per year to bring ill-prepared college students up the level at which they could cope with 
college-level course material. Since the program could potentially reduce the demand for 
remedial courses while in college, this could provide cost savings as well. As such, the relatively 
small per-pupil expenditure on the APIP may have high social returns due to both the sizable 
private returns for students and perhaps some cost savings for local governments.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for demographics for APIP schools and other comparison groups 
 APIP Schools  Future APIP Schools  Non-APIP Schools 
 1993 -1999 2000 -2005  1993 -1999 2000 -2005  1993 -1999 2000 -2005
Treat 0.15 0.74 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
 (0.36) (0.44) (0.0) (0.0)  (0.0) (0.0) 
Enrollment 1629.02 1731.97 2108.04 2068.36  716.85 751.56 
 (649.81) (710.62) (625.75) (511.64)  (781.97) (833.36) 
Mobility 479.30 469.03 592.63 568.74  178.19 180.73 
 (184.28) (187.08) (205.23) (155.26)  (199.44) (197.25) 
Percent White 32.67 28.71 26.69 17.30  59.38 53.36 
 (30.31) (27.93) (14.59) (12.95)  (29.46) (30.42) 
Percent Black 36.68 31.98 15.69 13.50  10.32 11.30 
 (31.86) (28.49) (15.6) (12.43)  (15.64) (17.08) 
Percent Hispanic 27.68 36.04 53.71 66.05  28.92 33.67 
 (24.46) (26.02) (21.35) (18.98)  (28.9) (29.5) 
Percent Asian 2.58 2.34 3.69 2.51  1.09 1.12 
 (3.41) (3.96) (3.45) (2.96)  (2.76) (2.98) 
Percent Free lunch 34.19 38.68 34.62 48.08  30.42 35.51 
 (22.97) (23.9) (20.8) (27.44)  (23.97) (26.25) 
Percent Limited English 9.50 10.16 10.01 11.84  3.57 3.83 
 (14.33) (12.61) (9.68) (10.21)  (7.71) (6.8) 
Grade 12 280.96 315.48 374.02 391.47  139.45 156.89 
 (125.96) (147.63) (126.18) (125.88)  (166.03) (186.44) 
Lag Grade 11 329.44 359.90 439.05 450.64  156.39 172.80 
 (142.7) (156.15) (152.53) (151.79)  (187.78) (206.57) 
2nd lag Grade 10 397.85 426.05 519.11 539.03  177.57 187.65 
 (170.2) (182.02) (170.5) (140.23)  (211.62) (222.18) 
City 0.902 0.769 0.813 0.672  0.182 0.197 
 (0.23) (0.42) (0.39) (0.47)  (0.39) (0.4) 
Rural 0.00 0.013 0.00 0.025  0.489 0.373 
 (0.0) (0.11) (0.0) (0.16)  (0.5) (0.48) 
High school graduates 267.00 321.09 335.94 378.75  132.25 156.08 
 (126.6) (148.86) (112.83) (123.29)  (156.32) (183.87) 
AP course Enrollment 389.08 414.68 412.84 405.55  270.03 339.58 
 (218.79) (252.67) (240.34) (264.61)  (318.23) (353.11) 
Percent 11 and 12th graders taking AP/IB (all) - 20.42 - 15.07  - 9.62 
 - (8.98) - (10.32)  - (11.62) 
Percent 11 and 12th graders taking AP/IB (black) - 12.90 - 9.09  - 6.38 
 - (7.72) - (7.65)  - (10.27) 
Percent 11 and 12th graders taking AP/IB (Hispanic) - 14.19 - 12.50  - 7.68 
 - (9.28) - (8.23)  - (10.24) 
Percent 11 and 12th graders taking AP/IB (white) - 29.60 - 23.88  - 12.58 
 - (15.54) - (20.08)  - (14.78) 
Graduates taking SAT/ACT 143.02 160.03 184.67 208.73  76.05 82.49 
 (92.11) (92.27) (79.29) (114.72)  (106.82) (120.35) 
Graduates scoring above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT 31.72 36.77 33.18 33.46  20.78 27.52 
 (39.39) (39.4) (26.84) (32.1)  (43.35) (54.61) 
College enrollees (any college in Texas) - 131.84 - 151.89  - 94.48 
 - (89.91) - (83.78)  - (108.44) 
Percent Graduates above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT (all) 16.44 18.25 18.05 15.81  18.04 20.70 
 (13.94) (15.33) (13.44) (13.88)  (12.8) (13.53) 
Percent Graduates above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT (black) 5.28 5.80 7.13 6.00  6.48 7.68 
 (6.25) (6.67) (7.27) (6.39)  (9.6) (9.92) 
Percent Graduates above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT (white) 32.65 37.76 29.16 31.34  23.74 27.78 
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 (15.51) (13.04) (19.9) (22.39)  (14.44) (14.46) 
Percent Graduates above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT (Hispanic) 10.78 12.33 11.38 10.34  9.54 12.46 
 (11.22) (11.66) (14.11) (10.18)  (11.58) (12.77) 
Percent Graduates who pass TAAS/TASP 35.814 59.997 37.836 58.207  42.281 65.114 
 (16.54) (15.31) (10.67) (12.36)  (16.21) (17.7) 
Percent 9th -12th graders taking college courses 15.518 18.408 13.177 17.987  14.917 16.527 
  (8.82) (7.37)  (7.61) (7.34)   (9.86) (11.45) 
Number of schools 40  18   1413 
Notes: School demographic data, high school graduation, and SAT/ACT data are available for 1993 through 2005; AB/IB examination data are 
available for years 2001 through 2005; college matriculation data are available for years 2001 through 2005; and AP course enrollments are 
available for 2000 through 2005. As such, the number of observations varies from variable to variable. While the regressions are estimated on a 
balanced sample, the sample averages show all the available data. Future APIP schools are those schools that will have adopted the APIP by 
2008 but had not done so by 2005. 
Mobility is the number of students who were enrolled in the school for less than 83 percent of the school year. Students have attained 
TAAS/TAKS equivalency if they have done well enough on the exit-level TAAS to have a 75 percent likelihood of passing the Texas Academic 
Skills Program tests for college readiness. College is the count of students who matriculated in college the fall after high school graduation in any 
school in Texas. 
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Table 2 
Main APIP adoption Effects 
Effect of APIP adoption on main outcomes (before/after comparison). Sample: APIP schools and future APIP-schools. 
log of AP course enrollment   N 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Placebo 
treatment  
Treat 0.162 0.082 0.058 0.0951 0.078 0.038 0.038 
 [0.063]** [0.069] [0.075] [0.0732] [0.072] [0.067] [0.067] 318 
Percent 11 and 12 graders taking AB/IB exams   
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Placebo 
treatment  
Treat 5.638 2.557 2.382 2.2206 2.233 2.198 -0.298 
 [0.919]** [1.051]* [0.874]* [0.676]* [0.878]* [0.893]* [1.211] 226 
log of graduates   
 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Placebo 
treatment  
Treat 0.227 0.106 0.0117 0.0118 0.009 0.005 -0.022 
 [0.030]** [0.036]** [0.0184] [0.0184] [0.017] [0.023] [0.021] 578 
log of SAT/ACT takers   
 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Placebo 
treatment  
Treat 0.189 0.063 -0.0435 -0.0464 -0.046 -0.045 -0.049 
 [0.037]** [0.046] [0.0408] [0.0541] [0.054] [0.045] [0.030] 578 
log score above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT   
 25 26 27 28 29 30 
Placebo 
treatment  
Treat 0.167 0.232 0.1361 0.1976 0.198 0.199 0.09 
 [0.058]** [0.070]** [0.0527]* [0.0253]** [0.025]** [0.046]** [0.084] 578 
log attend college   
 31 32 33 34 35 36 
Placebo 
treatment  
Treat 0.126 0.117 0.0496 0.0534 0.062 0.048 -0.085 
 [0.035]** [0.041]** [0.0283]+ [0.0294]+ [0.030]+ [0.041] [0.057] 226 
School fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Year fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Controls included NO NO 1 2 2* 2** 2  
Decile-by-year effects NO NO NO YES YES YES YES    
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard error clustered at the district level. 
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
All regressions are based on a panel of 57 schools. Each coefficient estimate is the result of a different regression. Each column represents the 
same specification, while each row indicates a different dependent variable. Demographic controls are log school enrollment, percent white, 
percent black, percent Hispanic, percent Asian, percent Native American, percent free lunch, percent LEP, and the log of mobile students. Model 
1 includes school controls and affected cohort size (grade 12, grade 11, lagged grade 11 and lagged grade 10 enrollment for AP outcomes, and 
grade 12 and lagged grade 11 enrollment for non-AP outcomes based on the cohort of high school graduates). Model 2 includes all variables in 
model 1 and year-by-propensity score decile fixed effects (the preferred model). Model 2* includes all variables in model 2 with the exception of 
11th and grade 12 enrollment for AP outcomes and omit grade 12 enrollment for the non-AP outcomes based on the cohort of high school 
graduates. Model 2** includes all variables in model 2 but excludes all grade enrollment variables. Placebo treatment uses the second lead of 
actual adoption as the treatment. This variable denotes two years before actual APIP adoption. 
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Table 3 
APIP Adoption Effects Over Time 
Effect of the APIP over time 
 Sample: schools that adopt APIP and future-APIP adopters 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
log of AP 
course 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12th 
graders taking 
AB/IB exams
log of 
graduates 
log of 
SAT/ACT 
takers 
log score above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
ln attend 
college 
       
First year 0.0805 1.8791 0.0099 -0.0315 0.1578 0.0521 
 [0.0787] [0.9338]+ [0.0148] [0.0451] [0.0331]** [0.0315] 
Second year 0.0942 3.8755 0.0107 -0.0482 0.2275 0.0602 
 [0.0928] [1.5498]* [0.0234] [0.0868] [0.0262]** [0.0250]* 
Third year and beyond 0.3358 3.4861 0.0196 -0.0915 0.2764 0.0726 
 [0.1419]* [1.4229]* [0.0350] [0.0513]+ [0.0387]** [0.0403]+ 
       
Observations 318 226 578 578 578 226 
       
 Sample: schools that adopt APIP after 2000 and future-APIP adopters 
 
log of AP 
course 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12th 
graders taking 
AB/IB exams
log of 
graduates 
log of 
SAT/ACT 
takers 
log score above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
ln attend 
college 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
       
First year 0.0715 1.3633 0.0016 -0.0494 0.2383 0.0588 
 [0.0932] [1.2020] [0.0269] [0.0593] [0.1020]* [0.0427] 
Second year 0.1011 3.2194 -0.0051 -0.1194 0.3204 0.0859 
 [0.1230] [1.9485] [0.0331] [0.0973] [0.0931]** [0.0477]+ 
Third year and beyond 0.3173 2.5845 0.0297 -0.2184 0.5791 0.113 
 [0.1775]+ [2.3064] [0.0371] [0.1101]+ [0.1104]** [0.0352]** 
       
Observations 265 190 483 483 483 190 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard error clustered at the district level. 
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
Columns 1 through 6 are based on a panel of 57 schools. Columns 7 through 12 are based on 48 schools.  All 
regressions are based on the preferred specification using the sample of APIP and future-APIP schools. All models 
include school demographic and enrollment variables, school fixed effects, and time fixed effects for each propensity 
score decile.  
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Table 4 
First Test for Selective Migration 
Tests for selective migration, effect on graduation rates, and substitution away from advanced courses 
Sample: Schools that will have adopted APIP by 2008 
 1 2 3 4 5  6a 7 
 
log grade 12 
enrollment
log school 
enrollment
percent 
students 
earning 
TASP  
log 
graduates
log of 
SAT/ACT 
takers  
log 
graduates 
percent 9th 
-12th 
graders 
taking 
advanced 
courses 
First year 0.0037 0.0139 2.0803 0.0099 -0.0315  0.0289 -1.174 
 [0.0113] [0.0146] [1.5921] [0.0148] [0.0451]  [0.0179] [1.453] 
Second year 0.0036 0.0171 -0.2053 0.0107 -0.0482  0.021 -2.24 
 [0.0154] [0.0210] [1.8429] [0.0234] [0.0868]  [0.0239] [1.262] 
Third year and beyond 0.0355 0.0372 1.2166 0.0196 -0.0915  0.0509 -0.885 
 [0.0321] [0.0244] [2.5610] [0.0350] [0.0513]+  [0.0287]+ [1.358] 
          
Grade 12 enrol. N N Y Y Y  N Y 
Lag grade 12 enrol. Y Y N N N  N N 
Second lag of grade 12 enrol.  Y Y N N N  Y N 
School enrol. N N Y Y Y  N Y 
Lag school enrol. Y Y N N N  N N 
Second lag of school enrol.  N N N N N  Y N 
Lag of grade 11 enrol. Y Y Y Y Y  N Y 
          
Observations 463 463  578 578 578   463 578 
Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets. Standard errors clustered at the school district level. 
+  significant  at  10 percent;  *  significant  at  5 percent;  **  significant  at  1 percent. 
In the variable names “enrol.” stands for enrollment. All regressions are based on a panel of 57 schools. All 
regressions include school fixed effects, year by propensity score decile fixed effects, and school demographic 
variables. 
a.  This model does not include current or lagged grade 12 or school enrollment, so that these estimates are 
conditional on grade 10 enrollments two years prior. This provides weak evidence that the APIP may increase the 
proportion of 10th graders who subsequently graduate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jackson    45   
Table 5 
Second Test for Selective Migration 
District level regressions 
  No controls for enrollment 
 1 2 3 5 5 6 
 
log of AP 
course 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12th 
graders taking 
AB/IB exams
log of 
graduates 
log of 
SAT/ACT 
takers 
log score 
above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
ln attend 
college 
Share treated 0.002 5.177 0.056 0.036 0.212 0.092 
 [0.084] [1.003]** [0.035] [0.048] [0.074]** [0.044]* 
       
  Controls for the second lag of 10th grade enrollment 
 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
log of AP 
course 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12th 
graders taking 
AB/IB exams
log of 
graduates 
log of 
SAT/ACT 
takers 
log score 
above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
ln attend 
college 
Share treated -0.042 5.023 0.026 -0.014 0.158 0.076 
 [0.084] [1.002]** [0.023] [0.038] [0.068]* [0.037]* 
       
  Controls for the second lag of 12th grade enrollment 
 13 14 15 16 17 18 
 
log of AP 
course 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12th 
graders taking 
AB/IB exams
log of 
graduates 
log of 
SAT/ACT 
takers 
log score 
above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
ln attend 
college 
Share treated -0.053 4.928 -0.003 -0.045 0.105 0.033 
 [0.083] [1.012]** [0.019] [0.036] [0.063]+ [0.037] 
       
Observations 85 171 171 156 156 74 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard error clustered at the district level. 
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
The results are based on a panel of 15 school districts. All regressions include district fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. Columns 1 through 6 have no other controls, columns 7 through 12 include the second lag of grade 10 
enrollment, and columns 13 through 18 show results that control for 12 grade enrollment at the district level. 
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Table 6 
Effects on AP/IB Examination Taking by Gender and Ethnicity 
APIP effect on percentage of 11th and 12th graders who took at least one AP or IB exam by gender and ethnicity 
Sample: schools that will have adopted APIP by 2008 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  All Black White Hispanic Female Male 
First year 1.8791 2.505 -0.203 2.033 2.035 1.943 
 [0.9338]+ [0.619]** [1.896] [1.035]+ [0.911]* [0.951]+ 
Second year 3.8755 4.293 -1.163 5.309 4.337 3.705 
 [1.5498]* [1.891]* [2.43] [1.820]* [1.225]** [1.288]* 
Third year and beyond 3.4861 2.673 0.388 6.099 2.125 5.657 
 [1.4229]* [1.717] [2.058] [2.893]+ [1.287] [1.665]** 
       
School fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year by decile fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 226 221 195 225 217 217 
Number of campus 57 56 51 57 56 56 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  + significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
Standard errors clustered at the school district level. 
Control variables include all school demographic and enrollment variables. 
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Table 7 
Effect on SAT/ACT Performance by Gender and Ethnicity 
APIP effect on percentage of graduates who scored above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT  
Sample: schools that will have adopted APIP by 2008 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 All Black White Hispanic Female Male 
First year 1.966 0.623 2.421 1.433 1.232 2.191 
 [0.592]** [0.751] [1.384]+ [1.341] [0.893] [0.968]* 
Second year 2.785 1.091 3.879 7.835 2.125 4.001 
 [0.486]** [0.926] [1.180]** [2.449]** [1.018]+ [1.451]* 
Third year and beyond 4.014 5.077 4.19 6.54 4.704 5.887 
 [1.079]** [1.873]* [1.535]* [3.172]+ [1.905]* [2.457]* 
       
School fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year by decile fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 693 402 318 381 424 423 
Number of campus 57 55 48 53 57 57 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  + significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
Standard errors clustered at the school district level. 
Control variables include all school demographic and enrollment variables. 
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Table 8 
Robustness to Selective Migration 
APIP effect on SAT/ACT performance of non movers by ethnicity 
Sample: All students who attended their 12th grade school for at least four years 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Subsample Black Hispanic White Black Hispanic White 
  
log above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
log above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
log above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
log above 
900/19 on 
SAT/ACT 
log above 
900/19 on 
SAT/ACT 
log above 
900/19 on 
SAT/ACT 
 Missing values assumed to be 2 
First year - 0.018 0.165 0.04 0.234 0.005 
 - [0.047] [0.055]** [0.052] [0.074]** [0.047] 
Second year - 0.12 0.242 -0.12 0.378 0.045 
 - [0.051]* [0.084]* [0.117] [0.116]** [0.063] 
Third year and beyond - 0.18 0.262 0.123 0.385 0.257 
 - [0.038]** [0.15]+ [0.092] [0.204]+ [0.096]* 
       
 Missing values assumed to be 4 
First year - 0.023 0.124 0.031 0.183 0.009 
 - [0.019] [0.046]* [0.04] [0.058]** [0.032] 
Second year - 0.084 0.166 -0.104 0.294 0.043 
 - [0.027]** [0.075]* [0.075] [0.089]** [0.035] 
Third year and beyond - 0.108 0.221 0.043 0.313 0.222 
 - [0.023]** (0.122) [0.065] [0.167]+ [0.063]** 
       
 Missing values assumed to be 0 
First year - 0.006 0.254 0.057 0.342 -0.003 
 - [0.113] [0.084]** [0.091] [0.116]* [0.096] 
Second year - 0.197 0.405 -0.156 0.56 0.051 
 - [0.13] [0.118]** [0.227] [0.182]** [0.139] 
Third year and beyond - 0.335 0.351 0.295 0.54 0.334 
 - [0.120]* [0.217] [0.175] [0.292]+ [0.185]+ 
              
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors clustered at school district level. 
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
Notes: All regressions are based on 384 observations from 57 schools. All regression specifications include school-
level controls, school fixed effects, year fixed effects, and propensity score decile by year fixed effects. Due to data 
masking count fewer than 5 are coded as missing. Treatment effects are not estimated for above 1100/24 for blacks 
because there are too many missing values. To provide bounds for those masked observations, missing values are 
assumed to be 4 and 0.   
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Table 9 
The Effects of APIP Adoption by Incentive Level 
The effects of APIP adoption by incentive level 
Sample: schools that will have adopted the APIP by 2008 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
log AP 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12th 
graders 
taking AP or 
IB exams 
log 
Graduates 
log 
SAT/ACT 
takers 
log Above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
log Attend 
College 
$100 per passing AP exam 0.062 3.882 0.033 -0.041 0.204 0.043 
 [0.135] [1.609]* [0.023] [0.030] [0.047]** [0.042] 
$101-$499 per passing AP exam 0.199 0.547 -0.002 -0.159 0.302 -0.11 
 [0.058]** [2.040] [0.044] [0.069]* [0.057]** [0.062]+ 
$500 per passing AP exam 0.021 1.347 -0.026 0.017 0.114 0.074 
 [0.051] [0.653]+ [0.025] [0.073] [0.051]* [0.022]** 
       
Controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
School fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year by decile fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 313 226 578 578 578 226 
Number of campus 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the school district level. 
+ significant at 10 percent; * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent. 
Control variables include all school demographic and enrollment variables. 
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Figure 1:  
Number of Schools Adopting the APIP by Year 
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List of APIP districts: Abilene ISD, Amarillo ISD, Austin ISD (2008), Burkburnett ISD, 
Carrollton-Farmers Branch ISD, City View ISD, Dallas ISD, Denison ISD, Galveston ISD, 
Houston ISD (2007), Pasadena ISD (2007), Pflugerville ISD, Tyler ISD, Wichita Falls ISD, 
Ysleta ISD (2007). 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Difference-in-difference estimates of APIP adoption on main outcomes (sample: APIP schools and future-APIP schools) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 
log AP 
course 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12 graders 
taking AB/IB 
exams 
log 
graduates 
log SAT/ACT 
takers 
log score above 
1100/24 on 
SAT/ACT 
log attend 
college 
log AP 
course 
enrollment 
percent 11th 
and 12 graders 
taking AB/IB 
exams 
log 
graduates 
log SAT/ACT 
takers 
log score 
above 1100/24 
on SAT/ACT
log attend 
college 
Treat 0.058 2.382 0.0117 -0.0435 0.1361 0.0496 0.095 2.206 0.0118 -0.0464 0.1976 0.0534 
 [0.075] [0.874] [0.0184] [0.0408] [0.0527]* [0.0280] [0.073] [0.676] [0.0184] [0.0541] [0.0253] [0.0294] 
log enrollment 0.585 7.716 0.5801 0.6347 -0.029 0.1447 0.583 8.456 0.5947 0.6775 -0.0295 0.0778 
 [0.572] [4.879] [0.1276] [0.1775] [0.1848] [0.2327] [0.588] [6.132] [0.1298] [0.1776] [0.1867] [0.2308] 
Percent white -0.188 -0.332 -0.0339 -0.0703 0.0003 0.099 -0.131 -0.744 -0.0574 -0.0689 0.0986 0.0431 
 [0.277] [5.159] [0.0556] [0.0574] [0.1947] [0.1554] [0.286] [6.210] [0.0643] [0.0530] [0.1927] [0.2035] 
Percent black -0.189 -0.728 -0.0412 -0.0807 0.0025 0.0915 -0.141 -1.107 -0.0655 -0.0804 0.091 0.0328 
 [0.272] [5.196] [0.0563] [0.0575] [0.1854] [0.1534] [0.283] [6.278] [0.0646] [0.0537] [0.1829] [0.2016] 
Percent Hispanic -0.211 -0.637 -0.0384 -0.0859 -0.0259 0.1074 -0.161 -1.095 -0.0631 -0.0861 0.065 0.0479 
 [0.282] [5.251] [0.0558] [0.0602] [0.1825] [0.1583] [0.289] [6.379] [0.0635] [0.0550] [0.1807] [0.2073] 
Percent Asian -0.2 0.169 -0.0399 -0.0875 -0.0227 0.1468 -0.159 -0.195 -0.064 -0.0869 0.064 0.0837 
 [0.272] [5.836] [0.0591] [0.0623] [0.1759] [0.1539] [0.283] [7.035] [0.0685] [0.0586] [0.1708] [0.1976] 
Percent Nat. Am. -0.1 2.986 -0.0036 -0.0506 0.0925 0.1673 -0.068 2.369 -0.0143 -0.0449 0.2029 0.1285 
 [0.233] [4.594] [0.0519] [0.0925] [0.2663] [0.1807] [0.256] [4.881] [0.0555] [0.0827] [0.2761] [0.2390] 
Percent Free lunch 0.003 0.056 0.0033 0.0039 -0.0027 -0.0028 0.005 0.053 0.0033 0.0038 -0.0029 -0.0022 
 [0.004] [0.085] [0.0009] [0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0022] [0.004] [0.107] [0.0010] [0.0013] [0.0020] [0.0023] 
Percent LEP -0.002 -0.084 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0084 -0.001 0 -0.012 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0072 -0.001 
 [0.007] [0.278] [0.0007] [0.0017] [0.0044] [0.0036] [0.006] [0.329] [0.0010] [0.0018] [0.0038] [0.0034] 
log Mobile 0.271 3.277 -0.0461 -0.0094 0.1362 -0.025 0.281 3.53 -0.0517 -0.0201 0.1444 0.0218 
 [0.163] [2.716] [0.0240] [0.0404] [0.0970] [0.1475] [0.170] [3.081] [0.0244] [0.0396] [0.1044] [0.1490] 
lag log of grade 11 -0.414 1.079 0.3916 0.3508 0.5307 0.4168 -0.455 0.843 0.4247 0.363 0.5489 0.4342 
 [0.249] [6.353] [0.0377] [0.1359] [0.1143] [0.1698] [0.258] [6.145] [0.0373] [0.1484] [0.1243] [0.2030] 
log grade 12  0.243 3.926 0.3891 0.4789 0.4771 0.4419 0.247 3.712 0.3441 0.4368 0.4382 0.4389 
 [0.180] [3.106] [0.0630] [0.2498] [0.1579] [0.2584] [0.158] [3.254] [0.0623] [0.2799] [0.1763] [0.2817] 
lag log of grade 10 -0.209 -9.844 - - - - -0.187 -11.096 - - - - 
 [0.232] [5.447] - - - - [0.240] [5.634] - - - - 
log grade 11 0.285 1.13 - - - - 0.311 2.339 - - - - 
 [0.315] [7.654] - - - - [0.291] [8.844] - - - - 
School effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Decile-year effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Schools 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Observations 318 226 578 578 578 226  318 226 578 578 578 226 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the school district level. Grade 10, grade 11 and grade 12 in the variable name indicates grade 10,11, and 12 enrollments respectively. 
Nat. Am. Stands for Native American.  
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Note A1 
The Texas ten percent rule was put in place in 1997 and ensured that the top ten percent of 
students from each high school in the state would be guaranteed admission to a Texas public 
university. One would expect college matriculation rates to have increased in schools that have 
on average low achievement, such as the selected APIP schools, even if these schools did not 
adopt the APIP.  
The Texas statewide Advanced Placement Incentive Program was introduced in academic 
year 1999-2000. Under the statewide program, the state appropriated $21 million over the years 
1998-2000 for the Texas APIP, up from $3 million the previous biennium. The statewide 
program provides a $30 reduction in exam fees for all public school students who are approved 
to take the AP exams, teacher training grants of up to $450, up to $3,000 in equipment and 
material grants for AP classes, and financial incentives to the schools of up to $100 for each 
student who scores 3 or better on any AP exam. One would expect this policy to increase AP 
participation and effort even if the APIP was not adopted by the selected APIP schools. (Source: 
Texas Education Agency Press Release: “Number of Advanced Placement Exams Taken by 
Texas Students Increases Dramatically”. August 23, 2000. 
http://www.tes.state.tx.us/press/pr000823.htm) 
 
Note A2 
In Texas, as of the 1998-99 academic year, students were only required to take 3 credits 
(often over 3 years starting in 9th grade) in mathematics and science and 4 credits in English to 
satisfy their high school graduation requirements. Therefore, students who had taken these 
courses by 10th or 11th grade would either have had a free period, be taking some less rigorous 
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elective, or be taking a dual enrollment course at a college. If schools did not offer AP 
mathematics, students who had fulfilled the graduation requirements would either have been 
involved in a dual enrollment course or have taken no math class at all. Students who had 
completed the science requirements would have been involved in a dual enrollment science class; 
taken a less rigorous science elective such as geology, anatomy, or physiology; or had a free 
period. Those students who took AP English courses would have been doing so in lieu of the 
standard high school English courses or a dual enrollment college course. (Sources: Walter 
Dewar, Executive Vice President AP Strategies, and counselors at several Dallas high schools) 
 
Note A3  
I estimate the propensity score using a probit model of treatment (APIP adoption) as a 
function of all the school demographic control variables and the first and second lags of the 
outcome variables (on the full sample). This captures the fact that treatment may be determined 
not only by school demographics but also based on historical performance and trends in the 
outcome variables. The propensity score estimates are shown in table 5. The estimated 
propensities vary for each school over time, since the covariates vary by year. I define the 
maximum estimated propensity score, across the years, to be the propensity score for that school. 
Because no schools located in a small or large town were ever treated or selected to be treated, 
all schools located in small or large towns were automatically removed from the sample. The 
estimates of this probit regression can be found in table A2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jackson    55   
Table A2 
Estimation of the Propensity Score 
Variable Treated Variable   
Mid-sized city 1.933 Mid-sized city*percent econ. disadvantaged 0.039 
 [1.025]  [0.012] 
Urban fringe of large city -0.862 Urban fringe of large city*percent econ. disadvantaged -0.044 
 [0.937]  [0.012] 
Urban fringe of mid-sized city -5.535 Urban fringe of mid-sized city*percent econ. disadvantaged 0.046 
 [1.855]  [0.017] 
Rural 2.155 Rural*percent economically disadvantaged -0.069 
 [1.312]  [0.022] 
log mobility 0.169 log of grade 12 enrollment -0.044 
 [0.125]  [0.369] 
Percent white -0.666 Mid-sized city*Log of grade 12 enrollment -0.097 
 [0.756]  [0.157] 
Percent native american 0.419 Urban fringe of large city*log of grade 12 enrollment 0.009 
 [0.755]  [0.137] 
Percent asian -0.675 Urban fringe of mid-sized city*log of grade 12 enrollment 0.96 
 [0.756]  [0.334] 
Percent limited english proficient 0.072 Rural*log of grade 12 enrollment -0.569 
 [0.007]  [0.213] 
Percent black -0.626 First lag of log of grade 12 enrollment -1.413 
 [0.756]  [0.468] 
Mid-sized city*percent black -0.049 Second lag of log of grade 12 enrollment -1.096 
 [0.010]  [0.482] 
Urban fringe of large city*percent black 0.01 First lag of log of grade 11 enrollment 0.411 
 [0.007]  [0.394] 
Urban fringe of mid-sized city*percent black -0.046 Lag of log of SAT/ACT takers 0.12 
 [0.014]  [0.304] 
Rural*percent black 0.033 Lag of above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT 0.068 
 [0.014]  [0.120] 
Percent Hispanic -0.644 Lag of number of graduates 1.296 
 [0.756]  [0.488] 
Mid-sized city*percent Hispanic -0.054 Second lag of log of SAT/ACT takers -0.206 
 [0.012  [0.306] 
Urban fringe of large city*percent Hispanic 0.016 Second lag of above 1100/24 on SAT/ACT 0.045 
 [0.009]  [0.114] 
Urban fringe of mid-sized city*percent Hispanic -0.079 Second lag of number of graduates 1.151 
 [0.020]  [0.515] 
Rural*percent Hispanic 0.015   
 [0.018] Observations 5888 
Percent Econ. disadvantaged -0.032 Robust standard errors in brackets.   
 [0.005] Model includes school and year effects. 
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Note A4  
For the post hoc power calculation I assume 30 treated school observation and 30 untreated 
school observations. (In actual fact there are 40 treated observations for some outcomes and 
more than 40 untreated observations for all outcomes). Since I condition on school effects and 
year effects, I use the variance of the within school residual (after taking out year effects) as the 
relevant variance of the outcome. I assume equal variance, and independence across groups 
(since I am using the within school variation) for ease of computation. Table A3 presents the 
results of this post hoc power analysis. In the last column, I show the effect size that one would 
expect to detect with 80 percent power (at the five percent significance level) in a two-sample t-
test. For all outcomes for which I find effects (except college enrollment), this minimum effect 
size lies within the range of the actual estimated effects. For college enrollment I calculated that 
the highest estimated effect would have been detected with more than 70 percent power at the 5 
percent significance level, and at the ten percent level with 80 percent power. 
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Table A3 
Post hoc Power Analysis 
  
Standard 
deviation of 
outcome 
(unconditional)
Standard 
deviation of 
outcome 
(conditional)
Range of actual 
estimated  
effects 
Minimum 
effect 
found with 
80 percent 
power and 
five percent 
significance 
log AP enrollment 0.68 0.23 0.058 to 0.33 0.165 
AP IB percent taking 9.7 4.1 2.198 to 3.48 2.99 
log graduates 0.5 0.08 0.005 to 0.019 0.058 
log take SAT/ACT 0.64 0.17 -0.04 to -0.09 -0.125 
log SAT/ACT>1100/24 1.44 0.37 0.136 to 0.2764 0.27 
log college 0.71 0.12 0.048 to 0.0726 0.087 
The 80 percent power effect is computed assuming 30 treated observations and 
30 untreated observations, equal variance across samples, and independence 
across samples. The 80 percent power effect is based on the more conservative 
two sided test and was computed using the “sampsi” command in STATA. 
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Figure A1 
Number of Exams Taken per Year by Subjects Rewarded  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 According to the August 2006 Current Population Survey, the percentage of white high-school 
graduates or GED holders between the ages of 25 and 29 ever enrolled in some college program 
was 71 for whites, 60 for blacks, and 52 for Hispanics. The implied two or four-year college 
completion percentages are 68 for whites, 51 for blacks, and 53 for Hispanics.  
2 In Card (1995), educational attainment is the result of a lifetime utility maximization problem 
based on available information. In this framework, new information could change students’ 
educational choices. See Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue (2002) for a discussion of 
time discounting and time preference. 
3 See Lyon (2007), Mathews (2007), and Medina (2007), www.nationalmathandscience.org. 
4 In his 2004 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced a plan under the No Child 
Left Behind Act to support state and local efforts to increase access to AP courses and exams 
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(http://www.whitehouse.gov/). Several states have programs with the same objective. For 
example,  the Western Consortium for Accelerated Learning Opportunities consisting of Arizona, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah.  
5 This list includes Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, and Kremer (2002); Angrist, Lang, and 
Oreopoulos (2009); Angrist and Lavy (2002, 2007); Atkinson et al. (2004); Eberts, Hollenbeck, 
and Stone (2000); Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2004); and Lavy (2002, 2004). Some 
psychologists have documented that external incentives for children can replace intrinsic 
motivation such that effort and performance may be worse after the incentives are removed than 
if they had never been introduced. See Alfie Kohn (1999) for an overview of this research. 
6 For a description of such policies see the appendix, note A1. 
7 Angrist and Lavy (2007) found that cash incentives improved educational outcomes for girls 
(including post-secondary enrollment). This is the only other study of a cash incentive program 
for high school students. 
8 While this is true in general, some highly selective colleges only allow students to use AP 
credits to pass out of prerequisites, but not toward regular graduation credit.  
9 Discussion with the executive vice president of AP Strategies and with counselors at several 
Dallas schools, 2006. For a description of the high school graduation requirements see appendix, 
note A2. 
10 One AP English teacher in Dallas had 6 students out of 11 score a 3 or higher on the AP 
examination in 1995, the year before the APIP was adopted. In 2003, when 49 of her 110 
students received a 3 or higher, she earned $11,550 for participating in the program; this was a 
substantial increase in annual earnings (Mathews 2004). 
11 There are a few exceptions. Schools in Austin were approached by the donor to adopt the 
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APIP in 2007. Also, five schools in Dallas secured a donor before approaching AP Strategies. 
12 For example:  The first ten Dallas schools were chosen based on proximity to AP Strategies; 
ST Microelectronics is located in the Carrolton-Farmers community and funded that district’s 
schools; the Priddy Foundation specifically requested the Burkburnett and City View schools; 
anonymous donors specifically requested Amarillo and Pflugerville schools; the Dell Foundation 
(headquartered in Austin) funds the Austin and Houston programs; and the remaining Dallas 
schools were funded by the O’Donell Foundation to complete the funding of Dallas Independent 
School District (ISD).  
13 The seven schools to adopt the APIP in 2008, however, decided to have the pre-AP 
preparation portion of the program in place for at least a year before the rewards were provided. 
14 A post hoc power analysis reveals that after removing school and year means, the residual 
variance is sufficiently small so that 30 schools (with both pre- and post-treatment data) are 
sufficient to detect effects  similar to those found with more than 0.80 power. See appendix note 
A4 for a more detailed discussion of this.  
15 For example, in 2005 four high schools were chosen by The Michael and Susan Dell 
Foundation from a list of seven willing Houston schools. The remaining three schools may adopt 
the program at a later date. 
16 Since some variables are not available for all years, and some schools did not exist during all 
years, sample sizes and composition may vary slightly over time. 
17 Due to changes in neighborhoods, the urbanicity variables do change within schools over time.  
18 This includes special education students completing an Independent Education Plan. Note: 
Students must pass the exit-level TAAS exam typically taken in 10th grade to graduate. Since the 
APIP affects 11th and 12th graders, I do not look at this outcome. 
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19 The raw number of non–special education graduates scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT 
for the campus is available. However, SAT/ACT performance is presented as the percentage of 
non–special education graduates scoring above 1100/24 on the SAT/ACT broken down by 
ethnicity. The number of non–special education graduates by ethnicity is not provided. 
20 This idea is similar to Costrell (1993), who models the information value of matriculating in 
college to learn one’s suitability. He argues that this could explain the low college completion 
rates among certain populations.   
21 According to the U.S. Department of Education, average annual tuition costs in Texas were 
$8,057 in 2007. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in 2005 workers 18 and over with a 
bachelor’s degree earned an average of $51,206 a year.  One-third of the annual earnings plus 
half the tuition cost comes to $21,093.  
22 For students who are on free or reduced lunch, the reduction is $15. This reduction would only 
be very important if students were severely credit constrained.  
23 A large AP participation response could also indicate that (4) several students were bunched 
right on the margin at which the benefits outweigh the costs or (5) students who were not 
interested in going to college were taking AP courses solely for the rewards. Any smoothness 
assumption rules out (4). Guidance counselors claim that all AP students have college aspirations, 
ruling out (5). 
24 Estimation results are very similar using all other high schools as the comparison group. Using 
such comparison groups, however, makes the results susceptible to school selection on 
unobserved characteristics.  
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25 The data are set up so that if any one outcome has data in that year, all other outcomes also 
have data for that year (except for college going and AP/IB exam taking, which have smaller 
sample sizes).  
26 Results using different samples are not appreciably different.  
27 See appendix, note A3, for details of how the propensity score is estimated. 
28 For example, schools that adopted the program in 2005 will be used to identify the effect of 
the first year of the program but will not be used to identify the effect of having the program for 
two or more years. 
29 I use two years before adoption because the schools will have been in the implementation 
stages (for example, training, announcement) in the t-1 year, but will have had no exposure (and 
would probably not have been chosen by a donor) in t-2. As such, t-2 is the best placebo year. 
30 Since readers may wonder if APIP adoption is associated with increases in the graduation rate 
(conditional on grade 10 enrollment), I also estimate such a model. Column 6 of table 4 shows 
weak evidence that APIP adoption may increase graduation rates (not conditional on grade 11 or 
grade 12 enrollment) after two years. 
31 For example, Anderson (2005); Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009); Angrist and Lavy 
(2007); and Katz, Kling, and Ludwig (2005). 
32 To preserve student confidentiality, the Texas Education Agency does not release data that is 
based on a sample of fewer than 5 students. If statistics for more than one group are requested, 
data are removed where statistics can be inferred from combining publicly available data and any 
of the other data requested.  The process of removing such data is referred to as “masking.” 
33 I cannot rule out the possibility that there was an influx of quality teachers to the APIP schools 
during the first year of the APIP program. This would not downplay the success of the program, 
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but would suggest that improvements in teacher inputs were a part of the story. 
